Glade Leon Parduhn v. Natalie Buchi, Allison Buchi, Annabelle Buchi, Lance Buchi, Jessica Buchi, Joanne Buchi : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
Glade Leon Parduhn v. Natalie Buchi, Allison
Buchi, Annabelle Buchi, Lance Buchi, Jessica Buchi,
Joanne Buchi : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
P. Bryan Fishburn; Fishburn 7 Associates, P.C.; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant and
Appellant Glade Leon Parduhn.
Martin S. Tanner; Howe .
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Glade Leon Parduhn v. Natalie Buchi, Allison Buchi, Annabelle Buchi, Lance Buchi, Jessica Buchi, Joanne Buchi, No.
20010926 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3559
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
FEB 1 5 2002 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME C O U R T ^ ^ o t a g g w . 
GLADE LEON PARDUHN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
NATALIE BUCHI, ALLISON BUCHI, 
ANNABELLE BUCHI, LANCE BUCHI and 
JESSICA BUCHI (the "Buchi Children") and 
JOANNE BUCHI, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEES 
(THE BUCHI CHILDREN) 
Oral Argument: March 14, 2002 
Case No. 2001-0926-SC 
(Consolidated With: 2001-0S11-SC) 
Argument Priority: 15 
Third District Civil No. 97-090-7879-MI 
On Appeal from the Third District Court 
Judges: Bruce C. Lubeck & Anne M. Stirba 
P. Bryan Fishburn, 4572 
FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
4505 South Wasatch Blvd., Suite 215 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Telephone: (801)277-3445 
Facsimile: (801)277-0333 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant 
and Appellant Glade Leon Parduhn 
Martin S. Tanner, 4419 
H O W E & TANNER 
340 Broadway Centre 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-5250 
Telephone: (801)575-7100 
Facsimile: (801) 575-7150 
E-mail: mtannerfl&xmission.com 
Defendants/Counterclaimants and Appellees 
Allison Buchi, Natalie Buchi, Annabelle Buchi, 
Lance Buchi and Jessica Buchi ("Buchi Children") 
Susan B.Dunn, 3784 
Tim Dalton Dunn, 0936 
DUNN & DUNN 
Midtown Plaza, Suite 460 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801)521-6666 
Fax:(801)521-9998 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Joanne Buchi 
i i i ' i i \ i i M r > \ L M i * \1 
- i ' ) \ - \ p n i n \ 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
NATALIE BUCHI, ALLISON BUCHI, 
ANNABELLE BUCHI, LANCE BUCHI an 
JESSICA BUCHI (the "Buchi Children") ai 
JOANNE BUCHI, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRILh O F T H E A P P E L L E E S 
(THE BUCHI CHILDREN) 
Oral Argu i i. iei.it: " 
Case No. -u<u-o92o-bC 
(Consolidated With- 2001-OS ! l-SC) 
Argun . :> 
Third District Civ. \ - *r-u90-7S79-MI 
Un Appeal nuni mc m n u LiVin^i v uuil 
Judne^ Hi-h-r^  r I nherk- X- Anne M. Stirba 
P. Bryan Fishburn, 4572 
F I S H B U R N & A S S O C I A T E S , v.r, 
4505 South Wasatch Blvd., Suite 215 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Telephone: (801)277-3445 
Facsimile: (801)277-0333 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant 
and Appellant Glade Leon Parduhn 
Martin S. Tanner, 4419 
WE & TAINNER 
Broadway Centre 
i i I East Broadway 
Salt Lake City. Ul S4111-5250 
Telephone: (S01 > 5~5-7lOO 
imile: (801) 575-7150 
' ,.r.N Uountcrckir T . , 
on Buchi, Natalie bin * , *.n, 'ollc buchi, 
i.in.ce Buchi and Jessica Buchi ("'Buchi Children") 
•MlSa i i D . L7U! II, ^ O-t 
Tim DaltonDunn, 0936 
_ \ N & D U N N 
Midtown Plaza, Suite 460 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801)521-6666 
Fax: (801)521-9998 
Attorneys for Defendant Appellee I  111IIIi I l m h i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
1. Parties 3 
2. Table of Authorities 4 
3. Issues for Review 5 
4. Statutes & Rules . . 6 
5. Statement of the Case 8 
6. Material Facts 10 
7. Summary of Argument 12 
8. Argument 13 
9. Conclusion & Relief Sought 22 
-2-
PARTIES 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Appellant: Glade Leon Parduhn 
(Partner of Brad Buchi, deceased) 
2. Defendants/Counterclaimants/Appellees: Natalie Buchi, Allison Buchi, Annabelle 
Buchi, Lance Buchi and Jessica Buchi 
(Children of Brad Buchi, deceased) 
3. Defendants/Counterclaimants/Appellees: Joanne Buchi 
(Widow of Brad Buchi, deceased) 
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ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Were there disputed material facts and was it legally correct for the trial court to deny 
Parduhn's August 18, 2000 summary judgment motion? 
2. Was there factual evidence to support, and was it legally correct for the court to 
conclude Buchi and Parduhn intended and agreed that upon Buchi's death the insurance proceeds go 
to his children and widow, and the partnership assets to Parduhn? 
3. Was it legally correct for the court to allow parol evidence to make that determination? 
4. Was there factual evidence to support, and was it legally correct for the court to 
conclude sale of the partnership's gas stations prior to Buchi's death did not make the partnership 
agreement, with its buy-sell provision, null and void since the partnership continued to exist after the 
sale, well after Buchi died? 
5. Did the trial court decide all material issues or did some remain for a second phase of 
the trial under the bifurcation agreement? 
6. Was there factual evidence to support, and was it legally correct for the court to 
conclude Parduhn did not have an insurable interest outside of the partnership agreement with its buy-
sell provision? Hence, if it is assumed as Parduhn claims, that the partnership agreement was null and 
void, did the court correctly conclude Parduhn still cannot claim the proceeds because he does not 
have an insurable interest? 
7. Did the court deny Parduhn due process by entering the September 16, 2001 Order and 
Judgment and did the court deny Parduhn due process by denying his motion for a stay pending this 
appeal? 
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STATUTES & RULES 
1. Utah Partnership Code: 
Utah Code Ann., Section 48-1-27. Partnership not terminated 
by dissolution. . . . On dissolution a partnership is not 
terminated, but continues until the winding up of the part-
nership affairs is completed. (Emphasis added) 8, 11, 14, 16, 19 
2. Utah Uniform Probate Code: 
Utah Code Ann., Section 75-6-201. Provisions for payment or 
transfer at death. (1) Any of the following provisions 
in . . . any . . . written instrument effective as a 
contract . . . are considered nontestamentary, and 
this code does not invalidate the instrument or any 
provision: 
(a) that money . . . controlled, or owned by a 
decedent shall be paid after his death to 
a person designated by the decedent in 
. . . a separate writing . . . ; 
(c) that any property which is the subject of the 
instrument shall pass to a person designated 
by the decedent in either the instrument or a 
separate writing . . . . 
Editorial Board Comment: . . . . The sole 
purpose of this section is to eliminate the 
testamentary characterization from the arrange-
ments falling within the terms of the section. It 
does not invalidate other arrangements by 
negative implication. (Emphasis added) 9, 16-18, 20 
3. Utah Insurance Code: 
Utah Code Ann. Section 31 A-22-413(l)(b). [N]o life insurance 
policy . . . may restrict the right of a policyholder . . . if 
the designation of beneficiary is not explicitly irrevocable, 
to change the beneficiary. . . . Subsection 75-6-201(l)(c) 
applies to designations by . . . separate writing. 
(Emphasis added) 17, 18 
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4. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law 13 
5. Rule 62, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Stay upon entry of judgment. Execution or other pro-
ceedings to enforce a judgment may issue immediately 
upon the entry of the judgment, unless the court in its 
discretion and on such condition for the security of the 
adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs 21 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a dispute over who should be awarded $300,000 in life insurance proceeds paid on the 
death of Brad Buchi. 
Plaintiff Glade Parduhn was Brad Buchi's business partner. His sole basis for claiming the 
proceeds is that he is the beneficiary named in the policy. He makes this claim even though the 
partnership agreement he entered into with Brad Buchi provides if one partner dies the other gets the 
business and the deceased partner' s family gets the insurance proceeds. Parduhn claims the 
partnership was dissolved upon the sale of its two gas stations. Without citing any authority, he claims 
r 
the partnership agreement with its buy-sell provision became "null and void" upon sale of the gas 
stations even though the partnership's affairs were not wound up, it had not settled its debts, it was 
involved in ongoing litigation and no final accounting or distribution had been made. Parduhn 
disregards Section 48-1-27, Utah Code Ann., which specifically provides that a partnership continues 
in existence after dissolution so that its affairs can be wound-up. 
The Defendants are Brad Buchi's children and widow. They claim the insurance proceeds 
for several reasons: (1) The partnership agreement entered into between Plaintiff and Brad Buchi 
provides that upon the death of a partner his family gets the insurance proceeds and the surviving 
partner gets the business; (2) The $300,000 policy was purchased at the insistence of Lisa Buchi, Brad 
Buchi's wife at the time (they have since divorced) to provide for the Buchi family under the terms 
of the partnership agreement if something happened to Brad Buchi; (3) The insurance application for 
the $300,000 policy states the purpose of the policy was for the partnership and its buy-sell provision; 
(4) There is no agreement, letter or other writing which provides the partnership's buy-sell provision 
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should be disregarded; (5) Buy-sell provisions in partnership agreements are commonplace and are 
allowed as nontestamentary contracts under Section 75-6-201, Utah Code Ann.; (6) There is no 
evidence Brad Buchi and Parduhn intended that if Buchi died, his widow and children would receive 
no part of the insurance proceeds while Parduhn would receive them all. 
After hearing the evidence at trial, Third District Court Judge Bruce Lubeck agreed with 
Buchi's widow and children. He awarded them the insurance proceeds and awarded Glade Parduhn 
all the partnership assets. Parduhn appealed. 
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MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Glade Parduhn and Brad Buchi (deceased) entered into a written partnership agreement 
dated May 23, 1979. Addendum to Appellant's Brief, Tab 9,p4; R.1620, pp. 20-21. 
2. The Agreement had a "key Man" life insurance provision. Addendum to Appellant's 
Brief, Tab 9,p4. 
3. "Key Man" life insurance is defined as follows: "Type of insurance coverage 
purchased by companies to protect them on the death or disability of a valued employee or by 
partnership to provide for funds with which to buy out the interest of such partner on his death 
or disability." (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 781) (Emphasis added). 
4. The "Key Man" provision of the partnership agreement provides as follows: 
[I]n the event of the death of either of the partners, Brad K. Buchi or 
Glade Parduhn, . . . the partnership will end, and all obligations to the 
deceased's survivors financially will be released by paying off the 
deceased persons [sic] survivors. Both partners are insured for $20,000 
and all of which will go to the deceased persons wife or survivors. 
When the survivors receive their $20,000, they release the other 
partner of any obligation in the business. The surviving partner will 
own the business and may do with the business as he see's [sic] fit. 
(Emphasis added). 
5. As their business grew, Parduhn and Brad Buchi decided to increase their life 
insurance. On January 25, 1984, they amended the partnership agreement to provide for $100,000 
coverage on each. The intent of Mr. Buchi and Mr. Parduhn that the deceased partner's wife and 
children would be entitled to the entire proceeds of the policy was reinforced when they wrote a small 
memorandum that states, "In the event of a death of either partner the remaining partner shall pay 
$100,000 to the survivors of the deceased with the proceeds of the $100,000 insurance policy which 
each own on each other. Addendum to Appellant's Brief, Tab 10. 
6. The business of Brad Buchi and Parduhn continued to grow. In 1989, Brad Buchi's 
wife Lisa Buchi thought the partnership needed more insurance so that if anything happened to her 
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husband, the Buchi family would be taken care of. R.1620, p. 102. 
7. As a result, the life insurance coverage was increased to $300,000 on the life of Brad 
Buchi and $250,000 on the life of Parduhn. R.1620, p.102-106. 
8. The intent was that Brad Buchi's wife and five children would receive $300,000 if he 
were to pass away, and that Parduhn's wife Nedra would receive $250,000 if he were to pass away. 
R.1620, p.102. 
9. This purpose was reinforced by the language in the insurance policy application wherein 
Glade Parduhn indicated the " purpose of the insurance and nature of Owner's insurable interest" 
was to fund the "Buy sell/partner[ ship]" agreement. Addendum to Appellant's Brief, Tab 11, 
"Application" pg.2, line 31f. 
10. The premium payments were not paid by the partners individually. All the premiums 
were paid by the partnership, reinforcing the fact that the policies were to fund the buy-sell portion 
of the partnership agreement. R.1620, p.47. 
11. A few days prior to August 8, 1997, Brad Buchi died. R.1620, p.57. 
12. At the time of his death, Mr. Buchi and Mr. Parduhn had already entered into an 
agreement to sell the assets of their partnership. The sale closed July 14, 1997. R.1620, p.32. 
13. There was no agreement, letter or other writing which terminated the partnership 
agreement at the time of closing or at any time thereafter. R.1620, pg49, lines 19-21. 
14. By operation of law, the partnership continued to exist after the closing during a 
winding up process. Section 48-1-27, Utah Code Ann. 
15. After the death of Brad Buchi it continued to exist to settle its debts and defend ongoing 
litigation. R.1620, pgs.38-39. Even now it continues to exist since no final accounting or distribution 
had been made. R.1620, pgs.38-39. 
16. Never did Brad Buchi and Parduhn enter into any agreement, written or otherwise, to 
disregard or supercede the partnership agreement with its buy-sell provision. R.1620, pgs. 50-51. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Parduhn' s summary judgment motion was properly denied because there were disputed 
facts and more than one conclusion of law could have been drawn. 
2. The facts presented at trial support the legal conclusion Parduhn and Buchi intended 
and agreed that Buchi's children and widow were entitled to the insurance money and Parduhn to the 
partnership assets upon Buchi's death. 
3. It was correct for the court to allow parol evidence to determine whether Brad Buchi 
and Parduhn intended and agreed that Parduhn have the partnership business and Buchi's widow and 
children have the insurance proceeds upon Brad Buchi's death. 
4. The court correctly concluded the sale of the partnership's gas stations prior to 
Buchi's death did not make the partnership agreement null and void. 
5. The trial court decided all material issues; none remain for a second phase of the trial 
under the bifurcation agreement. 
6. The trial court correctly concluded Parduhn did not have an insurable interest other than 
through the buy-sell agreement. 
7. The court did not deny Parduhn due process by entering the September 16, 2001 Order 
and Judgment or denying his motion for a stay pending this appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
A trial court's findings should not be disturbed on appeal where an appellant does not 
demonstrate they are legally insufficient and does not cite to the record of the trial court to 
demonstrate error. Burns v. Summerhavs, 927 P.2d 197, 198 (Utah 1989). An appellant must 
properly cite to the record, not fail to provide it or obfuscate it. See, generally, Commercial Union 
Associates v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29 (Utah App. 1993). 
I. PARDUHN'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION WAS PROPERLY DENIED 
BECAUSE THERE WERE DISPUTED FACTS AND MORE THAN ONE 
CONCLUSION OF LAW COULD HAVE BEEN DRAWN. 
Parduhn's first assignment of error is that the trial court should have granted his October 2001 
summary judgment motion. This claim can only succeed if there were no disputed material facts and 
only one legal conclusion could be drawn from those undisputed facts. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
There was a sworn statement from Brad Buchi's widow that the insurance policy in question 
was intended for Brad Buchi's family, not for Parduhn. R.521, paragraphs 12-13. This alone is 
enough to thwart Parduhn's summary judgment motion. Webster v. SilL 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 
1983) Also, the trial court properly determined that it was contested "whether the partnership was 
dissolved by the sale of the two service stations to Blackett Oil or the death of Brad Buchi" R.1107. 
The court determined that "even it is assumed the partners were in the process of dissolution, there 
are disputed issues regarding whether the partnership agreement and its buy-sell provision remained 
in full force and effect. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is denied." R.1108. 
The court ruled correctly. In Jackson v. Dabney, this court determined that even if the facts set forth 
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in the motion for summary judgment were not contested, as they were here, summary judgment is still 
inappropriate if reasonable minds could differ on the legal conclusions to be drawn from those facts. 
645 P.2d 613, 614-15 (Utah 1982). Stated another way, summary judgment is properly granted only 
when no genuine dispute exists as to material facts, only one legal inference or conclusion can be 
drawn from those undisputed material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Prichard v. State, 788 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Ariz. 1990) {en banc). 
Parduhn argues that sale of the gas stations amount to a dissolution. It was possible that it 
could be concluded legally that the sale did not amount to dissolution, which only occurred later, upon 
Buchi's death. Yet even if the sale amounted to dissolution, the partnership was not terminated but 
continued to exist. McCune & McCune v. Mountain Bell, 758 P.2d 914, 917 (Utah 1988). There 
was no factual or legal basis for the conclusion asserted in Parduhn's motion for summary judgment, 
that the partnership agreement with its buy-sell provision was "null and void." To the contrary, 
Utah's Partnership Code provides just the opposite: Utah Code Ann., Section 48-1-27. 
"Partnership not terminated by dissolution." "On dissolution a partnership is not terminated, but 
continues until the winding up of the partnership affairs is completed." (Emphasis added). 
As long as a partnership continues to exists, its activities are certainly governed by its 
partnership agreement. Parduhn has not cited a single authority for his claim the sale of the stations, 
which arguably amounted to dissolution, made the partnership agreement "null and void." Since the 
partnership was by statute not terminated but continued to exist, the partnership agreement also 
continued to exist and was not null and void, absent some agreement between the partners to the 
contrary. McCune & McCune v. Mountain Bell, 758 P.2d 914, 917 (Utah 1988). While the 
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partnership exists, the partnership agreement with its buy-sell provision thus governed its activities. 
Not a single fact exists to show an agreement to the contrary by the partners. The trial court was thus 
correct to deny Parduhn's summary judgment motion because neither undisputed facts nor a single 
statute or case mandated that it be granted. Simply stated, it could have been at the time of the 
summary judgment motion, and ultimately was concluded by the trial court, that the partnership 
agreement was in full force and effect at the time of Brad Buchi's death. R.1451. 
II. THE FACTS PRESENTED AT TRIAL SUPPORT THE LEGAL CONCLUSION 
PARDUHN AND BUCHI INTENDED AND AGREED THAT BUCHFS CHILDREN 
AND WIDOW WERE ENTITLED TO THE INSURANCE MONEY AND PARDUHN TO 
THE PARTNERSHIP ASSETS UPON BUCHFS DEATH. 
When challenging a trial court's decision, the appellant must marshal all the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings of fact and then show that evidence to be legally insufficient to 
support its conclusions of law. See_, e.g., Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1995). 
Parduhn has not only failed to marshal all the evidence supporting the trial court's findings of fact, 
he has also failed to show that evidence is legally insufficient to support its conclusions of law. 
Parduhn does not see the forest because he is only concentrating on a single tree. His single 
argument, the only tree in the forest he apparently sees, is his name as beneficiary on the insurance 
policy. He has failed to marshal the other significant evidence which supports the trial court's legal 
conclusion Parduhn's designation as beneficiary was not controlling, as follows: 
1. The partnership agreement entered into between Plaintiff and Brad Buchi 
provides that upon the death of a partner his family gets the insurance proceeds 
and the surviving partner gets the business. Addendum to Appellant's Brief, 
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Tab 9,p4; Tab 10 and R.1449. 
2. The $300,000 policy was purchased at the insistence of Lisa Buchi, Brad 
Buchi's wife at the time (they have since divorced) to provide for the Buchi 
family under the terms of the partnership agreement's buy-sell provision, if 
something happened to Brad Buchi. R.1620, pgs. 101-105 and R.1449-50. 
3. The insurance application for the $300,000 policy, was consideration for the 
policy and referenced therein, Addendum to Appellant's Brief, Tab 11,pi, 
R.1454, and states the purpose of the policy was for the partnership and its 
buy-sell provision. Hence the words "partner" and "buy-sell" found therein. 
Addendum to Appellant's Brief, Tab 12, para. 31a and 31f. 
4. There is no agreement, letter or other writing which terminated the partnership 
agreement prior to Brad Buchi death or provides that its buy-sell provision 
should be disregarded during a winding-up phase after dissolution. R.1620, 
pg49, lines 19-21. 
5. Factually, and as mandated by statute, the partnership continued to exist after 
the sale of the gas stations. Section 48-1-27, Utah Code Ann. During this 
time, it had not settled its debts, it was involved in ongoing litigation and no 
final accounting or distribution had been made. R.1620, pgs.38-39. 
6. Buy-sell provisions in partnership agreements are commonplace and are 
allowed as nontestamentary contracts. Section 75-6-201, Utah Code Ann. 
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7. As authorized by statute, buy-sell provisions may and often do override or 
supersede the beneficiary designation in an insurance policy. 
8. Clarifying the application of this statute to separate writings that change the 
beneficiary designated in insurance policies, Section 31A-22-413(l)(b), Utah 
Code Ann., provides as follows: 
[N]o life insurance policy ... may restrict the right of a policyholder . . . if the 
designation of beneficiary is not explicitly irrevocable, to change the 
beneficiary . . . . Subsection 75-6-20l(l)(c) applies to designations by . . . 
separate writing. (Emphasis added). 
9. No evidence was presented at trial that Brad Buchi and Parduhn intended that 
if Buchi died, his widow and children would receive no part of the insurance 
proceeds or that Parduhn would be entitled to it all. R.1455. 
There is ample factual evidence to support the legal conclusions made by the trial court that Parduhn 
was properly awarded the partnership business and Buchi's widow and children the insurance 
proceeds. 
The Northern Life Policy was part of a "Key Man" provision in the partnership agreement 
between Brad Buchi and Parduhn and should be interpreted as such. Under the terms of the 
partnership agreement, Brad Buchi's children, Natalie Buchi and her siblings, are entitled to the 
proceeds of the policy and Parduhn is entitled to the partnership assets. If Parduhn, in addition to the 
partnership assets were entitled to the proceeds of the policy on Brad Buchi's life, Parduhn would 
receive a double recovery in the form of both the insurance proceeds and Brad Buchi's half of the 
partnership. There is no factual evidence or basis for a legal conclusion Parduhn should retain his full 
interest in the partnership and also obtain the insurance proceeds on Brad Buchi's death. 
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Parduhn has failed to meet his burden on appeal to marshal the evidence which supports the 
trial court's conclusions and then demonstrate that evidence is insufficient to support the legal 
conclusions drawn by the trial court. 
III. IT WAS CORRECT FOR THE COURT TO ALLOW PAROL EVIDENCE TO 
DETERMINE WHETHER BUCHI AND PARDUHN INTENDED AND AGREED THAT 
PARDUHN HAVE THE PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS AND BUCHFS WIDOW AND 
CHILDREN HAVE THE INSURANCE PROCEEDS. 
On page 48 of the Brief of the Appellant, Parduhn mistakenly claims, "It was error for the 
trial court to look beyond the contract of insurance, to parol evidence . . . " to determine who Buchi 
and Parduhn intended and agreed should have the insurance proceeds if Buchi died. Parduhn argues 
the insurance policy was an integrated, unambiguous document and thus it was improper to look 
beyond its four corners. Yet there is factual and legal support for just such a conclusion. Utah statute 
specifically allows for just that to happen. See, Sections 75-6-201 and 31A-22-413(l)(b), Utah 
Code Ann. Factually, the policy's cover page states the consideration for the policy is the 
application for insurance which indicates the purpose for which Parduhn and Brad Buchi obtained the 
policy was to fund the partnership's buy-sell agreement. Parduhn asserts this evidence beyond the 
four-corners of the insurance contract should be disregarded. Yet this court has specifically held as 
follows: 
A judge should . . . consider any credible evidence offered to show the 
parties' intentions. While there is Utah case law that espouses a 
stricter application of the rule and would restrict a determination of 
whether ambiguity exists to a judge's determination of the meaning of 
the terms of the writing itself, the better-reasoned approach is to 
consider the writing in light of the surrounding circumstances. 
[Citations omitted]. Rational interpretation requires at least a 
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preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the 
intention of the parties . . . so that the court can place itself in the same 
situation in which the parties found themselves at the time of 
contracting." [Citations omitted]. If after considering such evidence 
the court determines that the interpretations contended for are 
reasonably supported by the language of the contract, then extrinsic 
evidence is admissible to clarify the ambiguous terms. (Emphasis 
added). 
Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Assn., 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995). 
Thus, contrary to Parduhn's assignment of error, it was entirely proper for the trial court to 
consider parol evidence to determine the intent and agreement of the parties as to whom the insurance 
proceeds should be awarded. 
IV. THE COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THE SALE OF THE PARTNERSHIP'S 
GAS STATIONS PRIOR TO BUCHF S DEATH DID NOT MAKE THE PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENT NULL AND VOID. 
Again, Parduhn fails to properly challenge the trial court's decision. Parduhn fails to 
marshal all the factual evidence which supports the trial court's decision that sale of the 
partnership's stations did not make the partnership agreement "null and void" as Parduhn claims. 
Evidence was presented at trial that after the sale of the stations, the partnership continued to exist 
during the winding-up phase. It was involved in resolving disputes and debts. R.1620,pgs. 38-39. 
It still had other assets. R.1620,pgs. 38-39. It was involved in litigation. R.1620,pgs. 38-39. It 
had yet to make a final accounting or disbursement of its assets. R.1620,pgs. 38-39. Parduhn fails 
to marshal these facts. He fails to take into account that dissolution does not mean termination. 
Utah's Partnership Code provides: Section 48-1-27, Utah Code Ann. "Partnership not terminated 
by dissolution." "On dissolution a partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up 
-19-
of the partnership affairs is completed." Id. (Emphasis added). 
Parduhn fails to cite any writing, agreement, statute or other authority for his proposition that 
dissolution terminates a buy-sell agreement. The plain language of the buy-sell agreement indicates 
otherwise. Upon the death of a partner, by operation of law, dissolution occurs, Section 48-1-28(4), 
Utah Code Ann., yet buy-sell agreements are by their very nature enforceable under such 
circumstances. See, also. Section 75-6-201, Utah Code Ann. 
Parduhn fails to meet his burden not only to marshal all evidence supporting the courts decision 
that the partnership agreement was not "null and void" upon sale of the stations, but also fails to show 
such evidence is legally insufficient to support the conclusion of law that the partnership agreement 
remained in full force and effect at the time of Brad Buchi's death. 
V, THE TRIAL COURT DECIDED ALL MATERIAL ISSUES; NONE REMAIN FOR A 
SECOND PHASE OF THE TRIAL UNDER THE BIFURCATION AGREEMENT. 
Given the court's decision that all of the proceeds were properly awarded to Brad Buchi's 
children and widow, there was no need for the court to hold a second phase of the trial for any of the 
three reasons expressed in the bifurcation agreement, Addendum to Appellant's Brief, Tab 3, page 
3, paras 1-3, as follows: (1) Parduhn was awarded the entire partnership so there was no need to 
determine any distribution of partnership assets; (2) Parduhn was not entitled to a setoff against 
Buchi's widow and children; and, (3) Natalie Buchi's claim against Parduhn was proper and thus 
did not amount to interference with contract. No issues remained for a second trial phase. 
-20-
VI. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED PARDUHN DID NOT HAVE AN 
INSURABLE INTEREST OTHER THAN THROUGH THE BUY-SELL AGREEMENT. 
Parduhn claims he had an insurable interest when he claimed the proceeds of the policy on 
Buchi's life and it was error for the court to determine otherwise. However, as the trial court points 
out, this issue is moot given its ruling on the facts. R.1456. If however this question need be 
addressed for any purpose, Section 31A-21-104(l)(b) provides, "a person may not knowingly 
procure . . . the proceeds of an insurance policy unless he has or expects to have an insurable 
interest in the subject of the insurance." (Emphasis added). At the time he claimed the proceeds, 
the partnership having been dissolved either by sale of the stations or later by Buchi's death, Parduhn 
could only have had an insurable interest through the buy-sell agreement. 
If it is assumed, as Parduhn claims, that the partnership agreement was null and void, Parduhn 
has no insurable interest and so still cannot claim the proceeds. 
VII. THE COURT DID NOT DENY PARDUHN DUE PROCESS BY ENTERING THE 
SEPTEMBER 16, 2001 ORDER AND JUDGMENT OR DENYING HIS MOTION FOR 
A STAY PENDING THIS APPEAL. 
If Parduhn' s appeal fails on any other basis, these claims of error are rendered moot. 
However, if they need be addressed, suffice it to say Parduhn has not cited any authority, statute or 
procedural rule (and cannot for none exists) which requires delay in entry of a judgment merely 
because a motion to reconsider has been filed. Similarly, Rule 62, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
provides that upon entry of a judgment, a stay may issue. The language is not mandatory. If failure 
to grant a stay violated due process, a stay would be mandatory upon meeting the security and other 
requirements of that rule. However, there is no mandatory language, no right to a stay and thus no 
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violation of due process if a stay is not granted. 
Further, in at least one case, this court has ruled that absent a strong showing of likelihood of 
success on the merits, the balance should tip in favor of denying a stay. Jensen v. Schwendiman, 
744 P.2d 1026,1027-28 (Utah 1987) Having lost at trial, Parduhn has not and cannot show a strong 
likelihood of success on the merits and thus a loss of due process rights for any failure by the trial 
court to grant him a stay. 
CONCLUSION & RELIEF SOUGHT 
The well reasoned decision of the trial court should stand. Parduhn's appeal should fail. The 
funds deposited with the clerk of the Third District Court, with any accrued interest, should be 
released to the Defendants who redeposited them. 
DATED this 
^ 
day of February, 2002. 
^ 
C I Liligalioit BuchiNatalii. AppcalXBRJEFotHESPONDENT"1 wpd 
artin S. Tanner 
OWE & TANNER 
Attorneys for Allison Buchi, Natalie Buchi, 
Annabelle Buchi, Lance Buchi & Jessica Buchi 
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